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Abstract
Left-right partisan conflict has been a key driver of welfare state expansion and retrench-
ment over time and across countries. Yet, we know very little about how left-right
differences in party appeals vary across social policy domains. Why are some issues
contentious while there is broad consensus on others? This paper starts from the simple
premise that partisan conflict is a function of how popular a certain policy is. Based on this
assumption, it argues that the left-right gap should be (1) larger for revenue-side issues
than for expenditure-side issues, (2) larger for policies targeted at groups that are viewed
as less deserving and (3) larger for more redistributive programs than less redistributive
ones (e.g. means-tested versus earnings-related benefits). These expectations are tested on
fine-grained policy data coded from 65 Austrian party manifestos issued between 1970 and
2017 (N= 18,219). The analysis strongly supports the revenue–expenditure hypothesis
and the deservingness hypothesis, but not the redistribution hypothesis.
Keywords: Austria; manifestos; political parties; social policy; welfare states
Introduction
The welfare state is one of the most significant policy achievements that modern
democracies have produced. It consumes a large chunk of most developed
economies and directly affects millions of people’s living standards. The most influ-
ential theory to explain crossnational and overtime variation in welfare states views
them as the outcome of a struggle among political coalitions with varying degrees of
power resources. Thus, the size and shape of welfare states are understood largely as
a product of partisan and interest group conflict (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Huber
et al., 1993; Huber and Stephens, 2001; Korpi, 1983; Stephens, 1979).
While extremely useful in explaining broad system-level variation, this approach
has necessarily neglected variation in partisan conflict across different domains
within a single country or welfare regime. Yet, looking at real-world outcomes,
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it becomes clear that individual social programs within a country or regime type
often take radically divergent trajectories – even under the same political constella-
tion. The Thatcher governments, for instance, slashed unemployment and housing
benefits, but reforms to the National Health Service were much more modest in
scope (Pierson, 1996). The Swiss People’s Party has successfully pushed other
right-wing parties to retrench unemployment insurance but found it impossible
to agree to pension cuts (Afonso and Papadopoulos, 2015). By contrast, the
center-right cabinets governing Austria between 2000 and 2007 passed significant
pension cuts but substantially expanded childcare benefits (Rathgeb, forthcoming).
What is more, much of the growing literature on welfare chauvinism is focussed on
the fact that political actors promote generous policies for some groups (natives)
and retrenchment for others (nonnatives) (Careja et al., 2016; Ennser-Jedenastik,
2018; Otjes, 2019; Schumacher and van Kersbergen, 2016). Even in their replication
of Esping-Andersen’s (1990) regime classification, Scruggs and Allan (2006: 69)
conclude that “scores among social-insurance programmes are so weakly intercor-
related, we might just as well talk about the individual welfare programmes, not
regimes”.
One possible conclusion from this heterogeneous picture would be to argue that
the partisan hypothesis only goes so far in explaining welfare state outcomes – all
variation within countries during the same time period is therefore beyond its
explanatory reach. However, this paper makes a different case. It conjectures that
there are systematic – and hitherto underresearched – differences in the partisan
conflict that can explain divergent trajectories in social policy (Bandau and
Ahrens, 2020: 40).
Theoretically, this paper thus contributes to a more recent literature in compar-
ative social policy that seeks to explain why we should expect partisan differences to
vary across policy areas. Studies in this field have, for instance, theorised that
partisan conflict should be more important for employment protection than for
active and passive labour market policy (Rueda, 2005; 2007), more prevalent for
employment-related than for life course-related policies (Jensen, 2012) and more
intense on institutional than on policy reforms (Klitgaard et al., 2015).
Like these studies, this paper views parties as both policy-oriented and office-
oriented (Müller and Strøm, 1999; Strøm, 1990). In the pursuit of their preferred
policy outcomes, they are thus constrained by voter preferences. This constraint
will be especially severe for the most popular welfare state programs. Based on these
arguments, it is hypothesised that partisan conflict should be more intense (1)
for revenue-side issues than for expenditure-side issues (e.g. social insurance
contributions versus social insurance benefits), (2) for programs targeting groups
viewed as less deserving and (3) for more redistributive programs (e.g. means-tested
benefits).
These hypotheses are tested on extremely fine-grained policy data produced by
the Austrian National Election Study (Autnes) from 65 election manifestos issued
by seven parties across 15 parliamentary elections in Austria between 1970 and
2017. This data source yields 18,219 manifesto statements coded into 111 different
social policy issues that can be categorised according to the three hypotheses:
as referring to 1) revenue-side or expenditure-side issues, 2) groups viewed as
high-deserving or low-deserving and 3) earnings-related, universal or means-tested
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benefits. Examining the effects of these issue characteristics on partisan conflict
would be impossible with more conventional data on party positions. This paper
thus provides a uniquely granular account of party appeals on welfare state issues.
The analysis uses binary logistic models with random effects at the manifesto
level to predict the occurrence of proretrenchment statements as a function of party
ideology (left versus right) and its interaction with the three-issue characteristics
outlined above. The results show that the revenue–expenditure distinction and
deservingness perceptions strongly structure the intensity of partisan conflict over
social policy issues, whereas the degree of redistribution has no discernible impact.
These findings deepen our understanding of party competition over the welfare
state and thus contribute to understanding the heterogeneous effects of partisanship
on social policies.
Theoretical framework
Arguing the unpopular: making the case for retrenchment
A core tenet of the welfare state literature in the “age of austerity” is the observation
that, overall, the welfare state is very popular with voters, especially those programs
that benefit large parts of the population (Pierson, 1996). Through its massive
expansion during the early postwar decades, the welfare state has generated power-
ful constituencies that command significant electoral weight and have the capacity
to organise politically (e.g. pensioners, families, health, and care workers). As a
result, advocating for the retrenchment of social programs can be an electorally risky
proposition – even though it is not at all certain that government parties will
be punished for cutting social programs (Armingeon and Giger, 2008; Giger and
Nelson, 2011; Schumacher et al., 2013).
Still, parties and politicians that are ideologically committed to retrenching ben-
efits have strong incentives to “minimise the political costs involved” (Pierson, 1996:
145). One strategy is to build large proreform coalitions in order to share the elec-
toral costs (Hering, 2008). Another approach is to package retrenchment in ways
that are less visible to voters, for instance, tweaking indexation rules rather than
cutting nominal benefit levels (Jensen et al., 2018). Also, cuts in one area may be
compensated by more generous policies in another domain (Bonoli, 2000: 154).
Yet, while potentially beneficial in terms of policymaking, these strategies are less
useful in the competitive environment of election campaigns that discourage cross-
party cooperation, reward policy visibility and generally do not lend themselves to
explaining complex policy trade-offs.
Therefore, electoral competition may force parties to adopt their (stated) policy
preferences by moving closer to the median voter. As the “New Politics” approach
argues (Pierson, 1996; 2001), the expansion of the welfare state has shifted the polit-
ical equilibrium to the left, effectively turning its most popular policies into valence
issues on which there is only one electorally viable position (Budge and Farlie,
1983b; Stokes, 1963). After all, the median voter in most modern democracies is
almost certainly a (future) beneficiary of multiple welfare state programs. If public
opinion on a social policy issue converges to near-unanimous support, the policy
space within which parties can plausibly compete on this issue shrinks. Yet, because
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public opinion converges toward the left, this compression of the competitive policy
space happens in an asymmetric fashion. The more popular a policy, the greater the
pressure for parties on the right to move leftward. By contrast, there is no similarly
strong incentive for leftist parties to shift their position to the right.
The empirical implication of this argument is that the pressure on right-wing
parties to take more leftist positions will be greater for policies with broader support.
As a result, partisan differences should be a function of how popular a specific wel-
fare state program is. This argument follows the logic of the saliency theory of party
competition (Budge, 2015; Budge and Farlie, 1983b; Budge et al., 2001; Dolezal et al.,
2014). Saliency theory views party competition as an exercise in selective emphasis
rather than as a matter of parties taking contrasting positions across the most
important issues. Voters are assumed to have one preferred course of action on most
issues. Parties whose position on an issue is in line with that preference will strongly
emphasise that issue, whereas parties with positions that a majority of the electorate
rejects will avoid it.
The most straightforward implication of this argument would be that left-wing
parties (whose position on welfare state issues is closer to the median voter) should
talk more about social policy than right-wing parties. However, given the overall
importance of the welfare state as a policy issue, it may be electorally unfeasible
to pursue a strategy of complete issue avoidance.1 Hence, parties of the right have
an incentive to emphasise those welfare state issues on which a more restrictive posi-
tion is electorally less problematic. Partisan conflict – that is, the difference between
left-wing and right-wing parties – should thus become more visible in those policy
areas. Based on this reasoning, the following sections argue that partisan conflict
should be (1) more intense on “revenue issues” (e.g. social insurance contributions)
than on “expenditure issues” (e.g. social insurance benefits), (2) more intense for
programs whose recipients are perceived as less deserving (e.g. immigrants) and
(3) more intense for benefits that produce higher levels of redistribution (e.g.
means-tested programs).
Revenue and expenditure
Generous welfare states require high taxes and contributions. While the obligation
that government expenditures are ultimately paid for by government revenues
imposes a budget constraint on social policymakers, neither such constraint applies
to individual attitudes nor to campaign rhetoric. Indeed, large sections, often major-
ities, of the electorate endorse generically worded expenditure cuts, while at
the same time favouring specific spending increases (Taylor-Gooby, 2001: 143).
Therefore, the logic of political communication in election campaigns dictates that
parties emphasise the popular parts of their social policy agenda while downplaying
its less popular ones.
As argued above, this is exactly the prediction that the saliency theory of party
competition makes (Budge, 2015; Budge and Farlie, 1983b; Budge et al., 2001;
Robertson, 1976). It assumes that there is one course of action favoured by most
1The analysis below will demonstrate that the overall salience of welfare state issues is very similar for
left-wing and right-wing parties.
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voters on any given issue. For instance, most voters prefer generous social benefits
over less generous ones, yet they also favour paying less rather than more in taxes
and contributions (Budge and Farlie, 1983a: 24–25). The revenue side of the welfare
state (taxes, contributions or various forms of cost-sharing) is thus much less pop-
ular than the expenditure side (mostly cash transfers and in-kind benefits). It would
hence be rational for parties on the right to couch their retrenchment agenda in
terms of lessening the financial burden the welfare state imposes on taxpayers
while showing less restraint on the expenditure side.2 As a consequence, we should
assume that left-right differences will be greater on revenue-related issues than on
expenditure-related issues.
H1 Partisan conflict is more intense for issues related to revenue than for issues
related to expenditure.
Deservingness perceptions
Another way to sell retrenchment to the broader public is to talk mostly about
programs for groups that are not viewed as highly deserving. Deservingness consid-
erations are very easily triggered and even override egalitarian values as predictors of
welfare support (Petersen et al., 2011). People’s preferences about social policy
programs are thus not only determined by their material self-interest and their wel-
fare attitudes but also more strongly affected by the perceived deservingness of the
benefit claimants (Cavaillé and Trump, 2015; Petersen et al., 2011). Crucially for the
purpose at hand, deservingness perceptions vary systematically across social pro-
grams and their beneficiaries. For instance, Jensen and Petersen (2017) show that
health care politics are much less influenced by ideological and cultural differences
than the politics of unemployment. High levels of perceived deservingness thus
severely dampen political conflict.
Across countries, the literature typically finds a hierarchy of social groups, run-
ning from the highly deserving (the elderly, the sick, the disabled and families) to the
less deserving (the unemployed and the poor) and to the least deserving recipients
(immigrants) (van Oorschot, 2006).
This social hierarchy of deservingness creates a viable electoral strategy for par-
ties that seek to cut social spending while avoiding popular backlash against their
policy proposals. Assuming that retrenchment is more palatable to voters when it is
targeted at programs for groups that are perceived as less deserving, parties on the
right will focus their proretrenchment rhetoric on these policies, while avoiding talk
about cuts to benefits for groups perceived as more deserving. As a result, left-right
partisan conflict will be more pronounced when the social group affected by a pro-
gram ranks lower in deservingness perceptions. One increasingly common example
is the use of welfare chauvinism – the notion that natives should be entitled to the
full range of benefits offered by the welfare state, while nonnatives should receive
2Note, however, that the empirical analysis does not include generic issues of taxation. It only covers
funds that are earmarked to pay for social benefits (e.g. social insurance contributions or tax financing
of health care).
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only limited support, if any (Careja et al., 2016; Ennser-Jedenastik, 2018; Hjorth,
2016; Reeskens and van Oorschot, 2012).
H2 Partisan conflict is more intense for social policies that benefit groups with
lower perceived deservingness.
Degrees of redistribution
All social programs adhere to one of three principles of redistributive justice (Deutsch,
1975): equity, equality or need. The notion of equity (also termed merit or propor-
tionality) demands that an individual’s benefits are proportional to his or her contri-
butions. This principle is enshrined in social insurance systems with earnings-related
benefits. Equality implies that benefits are the same for everybody, a logic that is real-
ised by providing universal benefits. Finally, the need principle holds that benefits
should go primarily to those with the least material resources, thus requiring social
programs to be means-tested (Clasen and van Oorschot, 2002: 94).
These three types of benefit design produce different levels of redistribution.
Since modern welfare states generate the bulk of their revenue from taxes and con-
tributions on employment income, individuals with higher incomes will typically
carry a larger financial burden. Thus, the welfare state is financed disproportionately
by people on middle and higher incomes (OECD, 2018). As a result, earnings-
related schemes produce lower levels of redistribution than universal benefits which,
in turn, generate less redistribution than means-tested programs.
At the individual level, left-right ideology is strongly correlated with preferences
for redistributive principles. Right-wing voters have a greater tendency to favour
earnings-related over universal benefits and universal benefits over means-tested
programs (Reeskens and van Oorschot, 2013). This finding matches the (historical)
preference of right-wing parties for status-preserving social insurance systems with
earnings-related benefits. After all, social insurance schemes are a cornerstone of the
conservative-corporatist welfare states that are typically found in countries with
strong Christian democratic parties (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Kalyvas and van
Kersbergen, 2010; van Kersbergen, 2003).
One could, of course, argue against this logic that means-testing social benefits is
a way to reduce program costs, and may therefore be attractive to the political right.
Hence, the prominence of means-tested programs in liberal welfare regimes such as
the United States (US). Indeed, Korpi and Palme (1998) have shown that more tar-
geting of benefits is correlated with less redistribution in the aggregate. However,
since means-tested programs tend to activate “other-oriented” considerations
and thus deservingness perceptions (Muñoz and Pardos-Prado, 2019), they are
often politically more precarious than universal and earnings-related benefits
(Laenen, 2018; Larsen, 2008). This is especially true in the US, where voters’ views
of means-tested social programs are strongly driven by racial attitudes (Gilens,
1996; 2009).
H3 Left-right partisan conflict follows the degree of redistribution a social policy
generates. It is most intense for means-tested benefits, less intense for universal ben-
efits and least intense for earnings-related benefits.
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Case selection: the Austrian welfare state
The test case for these hypotheses is Austria, a typical Bismarckian welfare state
(Obinger and Tálos, 2010), with a generous, yet (until recently) strongly segmented,
social insurance system, family policies that tend to promote the male-breadwinner
model and a fairly robust system of social assistance. Also, hardly any other country
conforms as closely to the ideal-type of a coordinated market economy as Austria
(Siaroff, 1999). Strong corporatist institutions (social partnership) were established
during the postWWII era, when the Christian democratic Austrian People’s Party
(ÖVP) and the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) shared power in national govern-
ment (Katzenstein, 1987; Kittel, 2000). While mandatory membership for employ-
ees and employers has helped the Chambers of Labour and Business retain much of
their political influence, the decline of trade union density and the erosion of sup-
port for the two erstwhile major parties, SPÖ and ÖVP, have put Austrian social
partnership under strain (Helms et al., 2019). The tradition of tripartite decision-
making has therefore weakened, especially during the years when the ÖVP chose to
govern with the populist radical right Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), from 2000 to
2007, and from 2017 to 2019 (Pernicka and Hefler, 2015).
While these periods of right-wing governance have produced some cost-saving
reforms (as they have, in fact, some grand coalition governments before them), they
have not lowered overall social spending markedly, in part because they typically
expanded family benefits (Obinger and Tálos, 2010: 119–120).
In addition to ÖVP, SPÖ and FPÖ, the Austrian party system during the obser-
vation period featured one of the strongest Green parties in Europe, and two smaller
liberal parties, the Liberal Forum (LF, in parliament from 1993 to 1999) and Neos
(from 2013). The analysis also includes the BZÖ (Alliance Future Austria), a break-
away from the FPÖ that emerged in 2005 and was represented in parliament until
2013. The Austrian party system thus features all major party families in Europe.
There are several reasons why Austria is an interesting case for this study. For
one, we should expect the overall level of left-right conflict over social policy to be
limited. Strong corporatist institutions and the dominance of grand coalitions dur-
ing the postwar era have certainly dampened partisan conflict over socio-economic
issues. Also, the political right in Austria has never promoted a fierce agenda of
retrenchment. In fact, the ÖVP fits quite nicely into the pattern of Christian demo-
cratic parties working in tandem with the left to expand the welfare state (van
Kersbergen, 2003). While the FPÖ has, at times, pursued economically liberal poli-
cies, it has, during the past decades, mostly been focused on the issues of reforming
the political system and multiculturalism. As a result, findings from the low-conflict
Austrian case should have a reasonable chance of holding up in other contexts.
Even though overall conflict over the welfare state may be relatively muted,
FPÖ (since 2005) and ÖVP (since 2017) have become strong advocates of welfare
chauvinistic positions (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2016; 2020; Rathgeb, forthcoming). Thus,
multiculturalism has not only become a powerful new dividing line in Austrian pol-
itics (Aichholzer et al., 2014) but it has also spilled over into the socio-economic
realm. Therefore, Austria is a prime test case for the deservingness hypothesis
(which prominently features welfare chauvinistic positions).
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The welfare state in Austrian public opinion
The theoretical argument outlined above rests on several assumptions about public
opinion on the welfare state. The most basic premise is that the welfare state and its
core programs are popular. This is certainly the case in Austria, where the propor-
tion of respondents who (strongly) agree that the government should take measures
to close the gap between high and low incomes has ranged between 62 and 82% in
all waves of the European Social Survey since 2002. In addition, when asked
about specific programs, large majorities want to see spending levels on health
(94%), pensions (94%) and unemployment benefits (72%) preserved or increased
(Kritzinger et al., 2016).
The three hypotheses stated above also build on more specific assumptions for
which evidence is assembled in Table 1. First, H1 assumes that the revenue side of
the welfare state is more popular than the expenditure side. Direct data on this ques-
tion is difficult to come by, yet it is clear that voters’ enthusiasm for redistribution
shrinks when the necessary trade-off (high taxes) is introduced. For instance, in
the 2013 preelection survey (conducted by the Autnes), more than two-thirds
(69%) agree (strongly) with government taking measures to reduce income differ-
ences (5-point scale). However, when asked to place themselves on a scale from 0
(low taxes, few benefits) to 10 (high taxes, many benefits), only 31% picked a value
above the midpoint of the scale, and almost as many (27%) picked a value below the
midpoint.
H2 builds on the premise that there is a hierarchy of deservingness between
groups. Data from the European Values Study (EVS, 2020) support this assumption:
Table 1. Public opinion on the welfare state in Austria
Assumption Source Item Value
Revenue side of the welfare









Low taxes and few
benefits (0) versus
high taxes and many
benefits (10)
Values 6 to 10: 31%
Hierarchy of deservingness
(H2)


















Higher: left (L): 46%,
right (R): 64%
Same: L: 38%, R: 24%






Higher: L: 35%, R: 57%
Same: L: 50%, R: 32%
Lower: L: 8%, R: 2%
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Austrians’ concern for the living standards of the elderly (85%) and the sick and
disabled (83%) is far higher than for the unemployed (48%) or immigrants (35%).
Finally, H3 assumes that the tendency to prefer earnings-related over universal
and universal over means-tested benefits is more pronounced among right-wing
voters. Data from the fourth round of the European Social Survey (ESS, 2008) show
that Austrians who place themselves on the left (0 to 3 on an 11-point left-right
scale) support universal and means-tested benefit designs to a much greater extent
than those on the right (7 to 10). Earnings-related benefits, by contrast, are much
more popular among right-leaning respondents.
Taken together, the figures reported in Table 1 suggest that the assumptions
about public opinion that underlie the three hypotheses apply reasonably well in
the Austrian case.
Data and method
The data to test the hypotheses come from a fine-grained analysis of 65 election
manifestos issued by seven parties in Austria between 1970 and 2017 (Table 2).
The manifesto coding approach developed for the Autnes is unique in both issue
coverage and coding procedure. It transforms each natural sentence in a manifesto
into standardised statements that typically take the form “(Party) for (issue)” or
“(Party) against (issue)”. Take this bullet point from the FPÖ’s 2017 manifesto
as an example: “Annual inflation adjustment for family allowance, child tax credit
and child care benefit”. According to the Autnes unitisation rules, this demand will
produce the following statements:
• FPÖ for annual inflation adjustment of family allowance
• FPÖ for annual inflation adjustment of child tax credit
• FPÖ for annual inflation adjustment of child care benefit
These standardised statements are then recorded with three variables: the subject
actor (in this case the manifesto party), the issue category (taken from a catalogue
of over 700 issues) and the predicate – a numerical value that captures whether
the relationship between the subject actor and the issue is one of rejection (−1),
Table 2. Parties included in the analysis
Party Party (short) Party family Coverage
Social Democratic Party of Austria SPÖ Social Democrats (SD) 1970–2017
Austrian People’s Party ÖVP Christian-democratic (CD) 1970–2017
Freedom Party of Austria FPÖ Populist radical right (RR) 1970–2017
Greens – The Green Alternative Greens Green (GR) 1986–2017
Liberal Forum LF Liberal (LB) 1994–2002, 2008
Alliance Future Austria BZÖ Populist radical right (RR) 2006–2013
Neos – The New Austria Neos Liberal (LB) 2013–2017
Note: Elections to the Austrian Nationalrat took place in 1970, 1971, 1975, 1979, 1983, 1986, 1990, 1994, 1995, 1999, 2002,
2006, 2008, 2013 and 2017.
Journal of Public Policy 9
support (1) or neutral (0). The three statements in our example will, therefore, be
coded as shown in Table 3.
These numerical codes thus capture the fact that the FPÖ has made supportive
statements regarding the policies that fall under the three-issue categories (both
generic support and demands for a benefit increase are recorded with a value of
1). Applied across thousands of natural sentences in dozens of manifestos, this
approach produces an extremely detailed account of a party’s stated policy positions
(for an in-depth description of the coding procedure and reliability tests, see Dolezal
et al., 2016).
The dependent variable
The dependent variable is binary and records for each of the 18,219 statements
whether it promotes a proretrenchment position (1) or not (0). The analysis has
to be conducted at the statement level, since the three central independent predic-
tors (corresponding to H1, H2 and H3) vary within parties, manifestos and policy
areas. Aggregating the data to a higher level is therefore not an option.
Two steps had to be taken to arrive at the dependent variable. First, the “direc-
tion” of all 111 social policy issue codes in the data was coded as either expansionary
(−1), neutral (0) or proretrenchment (1) (see appendix for a full list). For example,
the issue “health care spending” (issue code: 11304) was categorised as expansion-
ary, because support for this issue signals that a party wants to maintain or increase
health care expenditures. By contrast, the issue “patient contributions/fees for out-
patient care” (11308) was classified as “proretrenchment”, because supporting this
position implies shifting health care costs from the public to private individuals. A
few issues could not clearly be classified as expansionary or proretrenchment and
were therefore coded as neutral, for example, electronic health records (11315) or a
uniform pension scheme (11603). In a second step, these directional codes were
combined with the relational (predicate) values that signal whether a statement
is in support of or in rejection of an issue (as shown in Table 3). All statements that
recorded either support for proretrenchment issues or rejection of expansionary
issues were classified as proretrenchment and thus coded 1 on the dependent vari-
able. All other statements were coded as 0.
For the purpose of this paper, the data will only include manifesto statements
referring to a welfare state category. In the above example, all three of the FPÖ’s
statements concern social policy, and all three are expansionist. By contrast, were
the FPÖ to advocate cuts in family allowances, the abolition of the child tax credit
and a lower child care benefit, all three statements would be classified as
Table 3. Coding example
Party Relation Issue
1300000 | FPÖ 1 11702 | Support for families, family allowance
1300000 | FPÖ 1 11705 | Tax deduction for families with children
1300000 | FPÖ 1 11706 | Child care benefit, maternity pay, maternity leave
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proretrenchment. Neutral statements (with a value of 0 in the predicate variable) are
never counted as proretrenchment. An alternative specification of the dependent
variable with neutral statements reclassified into the proretrenchment category is
presented in the appendix. The results are substantively identical to the ones pre-
sented below.
The independent variables
The three main independent variables for the analysis are the revenue–expenditure
distinction, the perceived deservingness of the policy’s target group and the degree
of redistribution. All are operationalised by classifying the 111 issue categories in the
data (Table A9 in the appendix).
First, all issue codes referring to the financing of the welfare state are coded as
“revenue issues”, whereas all those pertaining to spending money on cash transfers
or in-kind benefits are classified as “expenditure issues”. Typical “revenue issues”
include social insurance contributions, calls for (or against) tax-financing of certain
benefits, but also all forms of cost-sharing (deductibles, co-pays) or financing of
benefits and services by private actors (e.g. employer-sponsored pensions or private
health insurance). A number of issues that fit neither description well are categor-
ised as “generic” (e.g. working time regulations, collective bargaining or employ-
ment protection).
Second, in accordance with the literature (van Oorschot, 2000; 2006), the deserv-
ingness variable is coded as “low” for all policies targeting the poor, the unemployed
and nonnatives. All other programs are coded as “high” (i.e. those serving the
elderly, the sick, the disabled and families). A remainder category (generic) is used
for all issue codes that do not imply a specific target group, such as “redistribution”,
or “reform of chambers”.
Third, the redistribution variable records whether social programs are earnings-
related, universal or means-tested. In general, coding was based on the character of
the benefits that accrue to the recipient – even if the financing of those benefits fol-
lows a different logic. For instance, active labour market policy and health care are
both classified as universal, yet they are (at least partly) paid for through earnings-
related contributions. Also, social regulation was generally assumed to be universal
in character. As above, a residual category (generic) captures those issues that do not
fit into the three other groups (e.g. “trade unions”, “social partnership” or “atypical
employment”).
Data overview
Taken together, the 65 manifestos analysed yield no less than 18,219 statements on
welfare state issues. Figure 1 displays the proportion of statements in the party man-
ifestos that address social policy issues. On an average, parties devote very similar
levels of attention to the welfare state. The salience of social policy in the average
party manifesto (indicated by the dashed horizontal line) is between 13 (Greens)
and 16% (BZÖ), with no clear trend emerging over time. Left-wing parties (SPÖ
and Greens) devote an average of 14% to welfare state matters – the exact same
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proportion as the average right-wing party manifesto. At least in the aggregate, there
are thus no clear left-right differences in terms of issue attention.
By contrast, there are marked left-right differences in the proportion of prore-
trenchment statements. The left-wing parties have a consistently low share of
proretrenchment statements (Greens and SPÖ), whereas the parties of the right
(ÖVP, FPÖ, LF/Neos and BZÖ) display considerable overtime variation and notably
higher averages on the dependent variable. More specifically, the average Green
manifesto contains 6% proretrenchment statements among its social policy content,
and the average SPÖ manifesto scores at 13%. For the right-wing parties, the figures
are 31% (ÖVP), 37% (FPÖ), 45% (LF/Neos) and 22% (BZÖ), respectively.
Together, Figures 1 and 2 make a relevant point. While there clearly is a posi-
tional issue conflict (i.e. right-wing parties take more proretrenchment positions
than their competitors on the left), this conflict does not result in a lower overall
salience of social policy on the right. This implies that right-wing parties do not
generally avoid welfare state issues, but that they find ways of talking about the wel-
fare state that fit with their more proretrenchment agenda, while not jeopardising
their electoral ambitions. This is exactly where we would expect partisan left-right
conflict to be the most intense.
Figure 2 also suggests that a dichotomous left-right indicator captures a large
proportion of the overall partisan differences in the data. Cramér’s V for a tabula-
tion of the dependent variable across the seven parties is only marginally higher
(0.30) than for a crosstabulation of the dependent variable with a dichotomous clas-
sification of parties as left-wing (Greens, SPÖ) or right-wing (ÖVP, FPÖ, LF, Neos
and BZÖ) (0.28). Therefore, the analysis will proceed using this dichotomous
left-right indicator.
Figure 1. Salience of social policy in party manifestos.
Note: Calculated as the percentage of statements in each manifesto that addresses social policy issues. Dashed hori-
zontal lines represent means across a party’s manifestos. LF merged into Neos in 2014, therefore the two parties are
grouped together in one graph.
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Analysis
A first look at the bivariate relationships between the dependent variable and the
three main independent variables is provided in Figure 3. Proretrenchment posi-
tions are always more frequent on the right, yet the gaps between the ideological
camps vary quite substantially.
In accordance with H1, revenue-side issues elicit a much larger gap than
expenditure-side issues in the proportion of proretrenchment statements between
left and right. The left-right difference in revenue is 44 percentage points, whereas it
is a mere nine points for expenditure. This pattern is largely due to the fact that
hardly any party ever openly advocates directly limiting welfare state services
and transfers, whereas demands to cut the welfare state’s funding streams are more
common. Similarly, the notion that lower perceived deservingness is associated with
higher levels of partisan conflict (H2) is supported in the bivariate analysis. Yet, this
is not only due to the right-wing parties promoting more retrenchment for these
groups but also due to the complete absence of retrenchment proposals on the left.
Partisan conflict also varies by redistributive principles, yet not in the way antici-
pated in H3. Contrary to expectations, the left-right gap is somewhat smaller for
universal and means-tested programs than for earnings-related benefits.
These preliminary results should be taken with a grain of salt, though. After all,
the three explanatory variables are strongly correlated (Cramér’s V scores between
0.32 and 0.45). As an example, consider the fact that many means-tested benefits go
to groups viewed as less deserving. Therefore, it must remain for the multivariate
analysis to detect whether these bivariate relationships hold after including all cova-
riates at the same time. A crosstabulation of the three variables is reported in the
appendix (Table A2).
Figure 2. Share of proretrenchment statements in party manifestos.
Note: Calculated as the percentage of social policy statements in each manifesto that advocates for retrenchment.
Dashed horizontal lines represent means across a party’s manifestos. LF merged into Neos in 2014, therefore the two
parties are grouped together in one graph.
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The multivariate regressions are specified as binary logistic models with random
effects at the manifesto level. Since manifestos are clustered within parties (i.e.
a party’s statements at time t are not independent of its statements at t 1) but
also within election years (i.e. a party’s statements at time t are not independent
of what other parties say at t), the models use two-way clustering, with standard
errors clustered on both parties and election years (the implementation follows
Gu and Yoo 2019). An alternative specification with one-way-clustered standard
errors (on party-decades) yields virtually identical results (see Table A7 and
Figure A4 in appendix), as do other specifications (e.g. one-way clustering on mani-
festos, parties or election years).
To test whether the three-issue characteristics outlined in the hypotheses
(revenue/expenditure, deservingness and degree of redistribution) affect partisan
conflict, these characteristics interact with a dichotomous party indicator (0 =
right-wing party and 1 = left-wing party). This will tell us whether the propensity
of left-wing and right-wing parties to promote retrenchment varies with the three
explanatory factors outlined in the hypotheses. For instance, if parties across the ideo-
logical spectrum are equally (un)likely to argue for retrenchment of earnings-related
benefits, the interaction effect of the left-party dummy and the indicator of earnings-
related policies should be close to zero and statistically insignificant.
In addition, the model includes a number of control variables for which there are
theoretical reasons to assume that they are correlated with the dependent and/or the
main independent variables. First, the type of benefit (cash transfers, in-kind bene-
fits or social regulation) is closely related to its redistributive design. For example,
earnings-related programs typically pay cash benefits (e.g. pensions or unemploy-
ment insurance), whereas in-kind benefits are mostly universal (e.g. child care).
Second, as previous research has shown that institutional reforms display greater
left-right partisan effects than policy reforms (Klitgaard et al., 2015), an indicator
of institutional reforms is included. Third, the model features a dummy that denotes
whether the incumbent government cuts across the left-right divide (i.e. SPÖ-FPÖ
and SPÖ-ÖVP coalitions), because such crosscleavage coalitions may attenuate left-
right partisan conflict. Finally, decade dummies are included in order to account for
Figure 3. Proportion of retrenchment statements for left-wing and right-wing parties by revenue/expen-
diture, deservingness and redistribution.
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the possibility that partisan effects change over time. As with the main theoretical
explanatory variables, all of these controls are interacted with the left-party predic-
tor. This is because control variables for interaction effects need to be interacted
with the moderating variable in order to properly eliminate confounding effects
(Yzerbyt et al., 2004). Descriptive statistics for all variables are reported in the
appendix (Table A1).3
Since interaction terms are difficult to interpret from the regression coefficients
directly, the figures further below display the average marginal effects (AMEs) of the
left-party indicator for the different moderating variables.
Figure 4 provides us with information to evaluate the three hypotheses
outlined in the theoretical section. With regard to H1, the analysis finds a stark
difference in the effect of the left-party dummy between revenue-side and
expenditure-side issues. Left-wing parties are 47 percentage points less likely than
right-wing parties to make proretrenchment statements on revenue-side issues,
whereas the gap is only 15 points on expenditure-side issues. With regard to the
multiple benefits that welfare states provide, the manifesto rhetoric of right-wing
parties is thus much closer to that of the left than on questions of social insurance
contributions, tax-financing of social programs or cost-sharing (e.g. through deduc-
tibles or fees). In other words, parties diverge much more when discussing how
to finance the welfare state than when debating ways to spend the money. The
evidence thus corroborates H1.
Similarly, the deservingness hypothesis (H2) is strongly supported by the
results. Left-right differences are very large for policies that target the unemployed,
the poor or nonnatives. On these issues, the probability of a proretrenchment state-
ment is 46 percentage points lower for left-wing parties than for their right-wing
Figure 4. Average marginal effects (AMEs) of left party by (a) revenue/expenditure, (b) deservingness and
(c) redistribution.
Note: AMEs with 95% confidence intervals, calculated based on regression model in Table 4.
3Of course, there are more control variables that could be added, prime among them indicators of mac-
roeconomic performance. After all, partisan conflict may intensify in periods of economic downturn or high
inflation. A model controlling for GDP growth, unemployment and inflation is, therefore, included in the
appendix (Table A8). The results for the main independent variables remain virtually unchanged.
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competitors. Yet the left-right gap shrinks to a mere 14 points for welfare programs
catering to the elderly, the sick, the disabled and families. Partisan conflict is there-
fore considerably less intense on issues that relate to groups generally viewed as
more deserving. As for H1, party competition adapts to electoral pressures and pro-
duces much greater crossparty consensus on more popular policies.
By contrast, H3 finds no support in the data. The marginal effects of left party for
earnings-related, universal and means-tested programs are very similar in size
(between −24 and −19 percentage points). No matter whether parties talk about
earnings-related, universal or means-tested programs, left-wing parties are similarly
less likely to argue for retrenchment. The differences that appeared in the bivariate
comparison (Figure 3) disappear once other covariates are introduced in a multi-
variate model. For instance, means-tested benefits may elicit greater partisan
Table 4. Binary logistic regression (DV: proretrenchment statement)
Linear term Interaction with left party
Left party −1.680** (0.508)
Revenue/expenditure (H1)
Generic Reference
Revenue 1.029*** (0.295) −1.493* (0.450)
Expenditure −1.456*** (0.132) −1.293** (0.285)
Perceived deservingness (H2)
Generic Reference
High 0.384* (0.191) 2.208*** (0.579)
Low 1.185*** (0.171) −3.349*** (0.682)
Redistribution (H3)
Generic Reference
Earnings-related 0.0796 (0.368) 0.124 (1.312)
Universal −0.434 (0.093) −0.241 (0.577)
Means-tested −1.040** (0.467) −1.758* (0.860)
Benefit design
Generic Reference
Cash transfers −0.570* (0.233) −0.412 (2.066)
In-kind benefits −2.047*** (0.119) −1.582*** (0.449)
Social regulation −0.511 (0.314) −1.831 (0.984)
Reform type
Institutional reform 0.517* (0.243) 0.861 (1.020)
Government type
Crosscutting coalition −1.004*** (0.325) 0.625 (0.320)
Time
1970s Reference
1980s 0.664 (0.505) −0.260 (0.628)
1990s 1.691** (0.498) −1.461** (0.543)
2000s 0.0357 (0.311) −0.613 (0.393)
2010s 1.295** (0.469) −1.310* (0.523)
Constant 0.012 (0.415)




Note: Figures are unstandardised coefficients and two-way-clustered standard errors (on parties and election years) from
binary logistic regression with random effects at the manifesto level, *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001.
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conflict not because of their redistributive nature but because their recipients may be
viewed as less deserving (Muñoz and Pardos-Prado, 2019).4
To be sure, the findings in support of H1 and H2 may not be the most counter-
intuitive results. They are nevertheless important – not least because the effect sizes
are substantial. The AMEs for revenue-side policies and low-deservingness issues
are about three times the size of the AMEs for expenditure-side policies and
high-deservingness issues. These factors are, therefore, not just minor conditional-
ities on left-right partisan conflict – they strongly structure the public communica-
tion of political parties on welfare state issues.
Discussion and conclusion
The dynamics of partisan conflict have shaped modern welfare states like few other
forces. Yet, the comparative social policy literature often assumes (implicitly) that
partisan conflict is similar across different domains of the welfare state. This paper
uses fine-grained data on social policy statements in Austrian party manifestos to
demonstrate that there is large and systematic variation in left-right conflict over the
welfare state.
First, the analysis finds that partisan conflict is structured by the revenue–
expenditure distinction. Revenue-side policies attract much greater levels of partisan
conflict than those concerned with expenditures (i.e. social services and transfers).
Second, parties of the left and right often are in agreement over policies targeted at
groups that are viewed as highly deserving. By contrast, policies that primarily affect
groups with lower perceived deservingness (the poor, the unemployed and nonna-
tives) produce much greater partisan differences. These results are in line with
recent studies showing that parties tailor their appeals to specific social groups
(Ennser-Jedenastik, 2016; Thau, 2019). Third, no differences were found for policies
with different distributive logics. The levels of partisan conflict uncovered in the
analysis were similar for earnings-related, universal and means-tested programs.
On balance, these findings support the premise that electoral considerations
strongly influence public debates on social policy. As the core institutions of the
welfare state retain their popularity even in the face of mounting financial pressure,
parties strategically choose their battles. Proretrenchment arguments are thus much
more visible in those areas where cuts are palatable to the median voter.
To be sure, the analysis in this paper is limited in that it covers only one country
with one specific set of political and social policy institutions. The degree to which
we can generalise to other countries is thus likely a function of their similarity to the
Austrian case. However, many features of the Austrian case are, in fact, present in
other West European democracies, especially those with multiparty systems, strong
corporatist traditions and a Bismarckian welfare state.
With those caveats in mind, there are at least two important implications from
this study. First, the results suggest that, in the public debate, there is a danger of
4I refrain from discussing the effects of the control variables. Control variables serve the purpose of clos-
ing all relevant back-door paths between the dependent variable and the key predictors of interest (Pearl,
2009). As such, they may include the effects of other (correlated) confounders, and should therefore not be
interpreted (Cinelli and Hazlett, 2020).
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misalignment between the areas of social policy that are most contentious and
those that produce the largest financial burden for most advanced economies.
Expenditures for pensions, family benefits, health and social care constitute the bulk
of social spending in all Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) countries, yet partisan disagreement is focussed mostly on other areas
(which is, of course, part of the reason that spending in these domains is high).
This tendency may even exacerbate as the increased salience of immigration in
Europe pushes welfare chauvinist appeals to the top of the agenda. For example,
in its public communication, the Austrian government in office between 2017
and 2019 (a coalition of ÖVP and FPÖ) put great emphasis on cutbacks to family
benefits and social assistance for immigrants, even though these reforms would
make only the slightest dent in overall social spending.5 The public attention
devoted to an issue thus often corresponds weakly with its real-world significance.
The second implication is that the political debate over the welfare state tends to
neglect the budget constraint that is inherent in social policymaking. While govern-
ments have to strike a balance between revenue and expenditure, the analysis shows
partisan conflict to be much more intense when it comes to issues of financing the
welfare state. This produces a disconnect between commitments to expand or
maintain benefit levels and promises to cut taxes and contributions. In the
Austrian case, parties regularly promise to finance large tax cuts by finding efficien-
cies “in the system”, implementing “administrative reforms” and merging social
insurance organisations (a reform that is, in fact, likely to add costs in the short
term). While electorally beneficial, this strategy makes it difficult for voters to con-
sider the real trade-offs of taxing and spending that constrain policymaking in the
welfare state.
Data Availability Statement. Replication materials are available in the Journal of Public PolicyDataverse at
https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/QX9MPS.
Supplementary material. To view supplementary material for this article, please visit https://doi.org/10.
1017/S0143814X20000240
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